This essay examines the problem of water misallocation in the American West. Most water is devoted to agriculture where values at the margin at low, whereas growing urban and environmental demand values at the margin are much higher. Nevertheless, large price disparities persist and market re-allocation is both controversial and limited. Property rights to water are incomplete and weak and the transaction costs of exchange are high. Using the insights of the New Institutional Economics, I explore why this is the case and offer policy recommendations that emphasize reliance on Coasean exchange rather than state allocation and provision of water. The lessons apply for other settings elsewhere in the world where resource allocation is becoming an important problem.
For other resources, such as land, shifts in demand and associated re-allocation are accommodated routinely with little fanfare through market transactions. When values in new uses exceed those in existing ones, the resource is transferred to new applications. For instance, in areas where there is urban growth, adjacent farm land gradually shifts from crops to housing and commercial activities through the real-estate market. In areas where there is growing recreational and amenity demand, local governments purchase properties for parks or wildlife habitat. There generally is little controversy. Markets perform these services because property rights and contracts are well-defined and enforced, providing the basis for exchange among competing users. This is not the case for water, however. In general, water does not flow easily or routinely through market transactions from one application to another-in the American West, from agriculture to urban and environmental uses. This essay explores why. It also describes how the insights of the New Institution Economics, particularly transaction cost and property rights concepts, reveal why markets have not developed as effectively for water as they have for land, and what useful policy responses might be considered to promote smoother, more timely re-allocation.
II. Political/Bureaucratic Versus Market Allocation of Water.
For many, water is viewed as too special or too essential a commodity for private markets. They argue that markets are both irrelevant and impractical for water allocation and management. For these critics, the ownership and provision of water should be left to the state because water is a public resource and low-cost access should be regarded as a fundamental human right. 2 But advocates of state solutions to water supply problems fail to specify the political and bureaucratic models they have in mind for assurance that the state would perform better than would a market alternative. They do not articulate the circumstances under which political and bureaucratic allocation decisions would be more welfare-enhancing than would market exchange.
There are some reasons for skepticism. While the problems of market failure are well known and emphasized by those who favor bureaucratic allocation of water, public choice theory and research also has demonstrated the problems of government failure, where political decisions are dominated by interest group politics and short time horizons. 3 Under these circumstances, unless there are competitive interest groups and governments, private interests, rather than public concerns are more likely to be advanced by government allocation. 4 Accordingly, caution and clarity are required by both advocates of market or state solutions to water allocation problems.
The provision of non-rivalrous or non-excludable (public) goods is one argument for state allocation of water since markets are likely to under-provide such goods due to lack of appropriability and free-riding. But these characteristics do not apply to most new water demands. They are largely for private consumption (residential or manufacturing uses) or for a mixture of rivalrous goods (irrigation, urban consumption) and non-rivalrous goods (instream flows for recreation as well as amenities and aquatic habitat). Older uses are dominantly in agriculture for irrigation. Hence, most water re-allocation involves moving water from one private (excludable) use to another. Under these circumstances, market distributions are appropriate. If there are important third-party effects as is possible and described below, then regulatory oversight is warranted for proposed water exchanges.
Where new water demand involves a mixture of rivalrous and non-rivalrous goods, then Political, rather, than market allocation occurs without the information about competing uses generated by market trades. Hence, there is no clear mechanism for new demands and values to stimulate re-allocation smoothly and flexibly. Further, because current claimants have limited ability to capture the economic gains from political re-allocation or to be compensated for any losses should it take place, they resist adjustments, even if they are socially beneficial in the aggregate. Because of their established ties to politicians, current users are well-placed politically to block re-allocation. Accordingly, current resource allocations are unlikely to respond to the emergence of new social and economic uses as occurs regularly in markets. With many constituencies having a stake in existing allocations and a potential veto in any reallocation, a paralysis in present uses emerge as a type of anti-commons. 5 In contrast, where relatively competitive markets exist, those who hold property rights to private goods can quickly respond to new market demand and supply conditions, and they have incentive to do so because they are residual claimants to the gains involved. They also have incentive to invest in the resource (to conserve, augment, or improve it), motivations that are lacking with state ownership and provision.
There is, however, another legitimate cause for concern about the efficacy of market allocation of water. Markets require clearly defined and enforced property rights to provide the basis for exchange. Yet and perhaps surprisingly in the American West, property rights to water are incomplete, vaguely defined, and subject to state appropriation. Weak property rights are an outcome of the physical characteristics of water that raise the costs of measuring, bounding, and enforcing individual claims. There are also legal and organizational factors that raise the costs of exclusion and defining and enforcing rights. Where the costs of measurement and exclusion are very high, then it may not be efficient to precisely define property rights and rely on unregulated markets for re-allocation. As described below, because surface water flows and therefore is difficult to partition and is often hydrologicly linked to groundwater, which is not observable or easily measured, it is more difficult to define property rights to water than to other stationary resources like land. For these reasons efficient re-allocation of water requires both the better definition of water rights where possible, and likely a regulatory role for the state in addressing externalities.
This essay uses the tools of the New Institutional Economics to examine the nature of the transaction costs that inhibits the definition of property rights and trade in water. The policy response to water allocation problems emphasized here is a Coasean one, rather than a call for more direct state provision. The essay instead examines the ways that the state might assist in the definition of property rights to water and in lowering the transaction costs of exchange to promote its more effective re-distribution.
The works of Coase (1960) , Demsetz (1967) , Cheung (1970) , Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , Dahlman (1979) , Barzel (1982 Barzel ( , 1989 , Libecap (1989) and others provide a critical foundation for understanding property rights and transaction costs. The insights from this literature help in determining what actions might be taken to better define property rights to water, to lower the transaction costs of exchange, and to ascertain when market allocation will be possible when it will not be.
III. The Misallocation of Water in the American West.
In the western U. Source: Libecap (2006) The data in the figure show mean agriculture-to-non-agriculture (urban and environmental) and "other" transaction prices by year. The other category is primarily agriculture-to-agriculture trades, but there are also some urban-to-urban, and urban-to- And the difference in prices is increasing.
There have been growing water trades, but they have not been sufficient to narrow the price gaps. Indeed, Figure 2 shows the amount of water moved annually from agriculture to urban and environmental uses, again for 1987 to 2003. 8 Further, Figure 3 shows the number of transfers by category over the same period. In the face of increased demand in other sectors, more water is being sent from agriculture, over 3,000,000 acre feet by 2003. And since 1995, the number of agriculture-to-urban-and-environmental transactions has exceeded those among farmers and other transactions. 9 Even so, water markets are controversial and water trades are too limited to arbitrage way those price differences that are not due to conveyance costs and variation in water quality. The question is then, why are water exchanges more limited than we might expect and what are the sources of high transaction costs? In answering this question, it makes sense to examine the nature of water rights to water in the Western U.S. In doing so, we find that water rights are weaker than are rights to other natural resources.
IV. Legal and Organizational Reasons for Weak Water Rights.
A. Non-Vested Usufruct Rights. Many of the problems of water lie in the complex system of property rights and the difficulty of defining them. In western states, individuals do not own water as they might own land. Water is "owned" by the state in trust for its citizens and its use regulated based on public interest or welfare concepts. As stated in Wyoming law, for example: "Because water is so important to the economy of this state, its use is always limited by a concept of public trust; the only uses for which water rights may be established are those which receive 'public recognition' under the law of the state." 13 Accordingly, individuals generally hold only usufruct rights to the water, subject to the requirement that the use be beneficial and reasonable and to oversight by the state in monitoring transfers to insure that they are consistent with the public interest. Since individuals have use rights, rather than absolute title, their ownership of water is conditional to actions by the state and regulatory interpretations as to whether particular private actions are "beneficial and reasonable." These requirements are sufficiently vague that they can be interpreted in a variety of ways that can undermine existing ownership patterns.
One major source of uncertainty is regulatory application of the public trust doctrine. The "public trust" is a common law principle creating the legal right of the public to utilize certain lands and waters, such as tidewaters or navigable rivers, and other waters and natural resources with high amenity or public goods values. Under the doctrine, the rights of the public are vested in the state as owner of the resource and trustee of its proper use. In a far-reaching ruling by the California Supreme Court in 1983 in the Mono Lake case (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court 685 P.2d 709) the court stated that the "core of the public trust doctrine is the state's authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over" the waters of the state.
14 This opinion energized expansion of the public trust doctrine in other court rulings in western states to restrict "excessive" diversions from non-navigable streams to protect aquatic environments. And state legislatures have been involved. For example, a 1988 Oregon statute that allowed water users to sell or lease any water they conserved, included a tax that required about 25 percent of the saved water be given to the state and held for in-stream flow maintenance.
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The public trust doctrine can be applied retrospectively to roll back pre-existing water rights that appear inconsistent with the public trust. Under the doctrine, private water usufruct rights are non vested and revocable and that any re-allocation of water by the state can be done without compensation to existing water claimants. 16 The doctrine also lowers the costs of holdup strategies by providing legal standing for parties to contest private water diversions or proposed trades as violations of the public trust. These broad regulatory powers, then, potentially add important uncertainty to water ownership, weakening existing property rights and their ability to promote investment, trade, and efficient use of water.
This is not to say that the public trust doctrine is never warranted. Indeed, where there are important non-exclusive values in augmenting stream flows for aquatic habitat, riparian restoration, and other amenity and recreational goods, then state intervention to re-allocate water from existing irrigation uses can be called for. But the state should then compensate existing users for their lost water. This accomplishes two objectives. One is that it forces the state to calculate the monetary benefits of greater instream flows to because it has to pay for them and equating marginal benefits with marginal costs can then lead to determination of just how much water should be diverted. This information leads to a more efficient re-distribution of water.
Currently, such decisions are made solely on biological or hydraulic grounds with little economic consideration. The other gain is that compensation reduces the resistance of current users who will lose their water. Compensation allows the re-allocation to be a positive sum game rather than a negative sum where parties are made worse off by the re-deployment of water. The resistance of uncompensated parties can raise the costs of providing and defending the provision of the new non-rivalrous public good.
B. Appropriative Water Rights Subject to State Regulation.
Private claims to surface and ground water in the West are made under the doctrine of prior appropriation: First in time, first in right. 17 In the case of surface water such as that found in streams, the appropriative doctrine allows rights holders to withdraw a certain amount of water from its natural course for private beneficial purposes on land remote from the point of diversion. The water can be separated from the land on which it flows and shipped elsewhere via aqueducts, ditches or other means of conveyance. This approach to water ownership is quite different from that found in the eastern U.S. where the riparian system dominates. Under the riparian system, water ownership comes with the land that borders flowing streams. Water is not separable from the land that is appurtenant to it. In this case, water is held in common with other property owners.
The appropriative doctrine emerged in the 19 th century in response to the development of mining and agriculture in the semi-arid West where growing numbers of people and economic activities were concentrated increasingly in areas where there was too little water. There was a need to move the water to where the people were located.
The maintenance of appropriative rights is based on placing claimed water into beneficial use, whereby parties can only divert what they productively use and leave the rest for subsequent claimants. Those with the earliest water claims have the highest priority and those with ensuing claims have lower-priority or junior rights. These junior claims are often to water that previously has been diverted by senior rights holders, but not consumed. For example, when farmers withdraw water for irrigation, as much as 50 percent can percolate back through the soil to the original stream or ditch. As a consequence, water claimants within a single draining area are intricately intertwined. This creates potential externalities from water sales. Diverted agricultural water that is sold and shipped to urban or environmental uses, will no longer be available for later use by junior parties. Accordingly, water trades that involve changes in nature, timing, or location of use must demonstrate that there is "no harm" to third parties, giving state regulatory agencies a mandate to review proposed water exchanges to minimize or compensate for the negative third-party effects on junior rights holders.
The resulting regulatory policies differ across the states. California has the strongest protransfer laws, but its regulatory and property rights environments are less supportive. These include mixed jurisdictions among state and federal agencies, a patchwork of county regulations and restrictions on water export, and a complex system of water rights with differential requirements for agency review. As a result, the administrative process can be lengthy and complex, and the outcome uncertain. These factors reduce the expected gains from trade.
Among other states, New Mexico also is viewed as having a supportive legal and regulatory structure for water trades. Approval of trades can occur within three months. 18 In
Colorado there are different regulatory structures within the state. In most of Colorado, water courts handle damage claims for proposed water transactions, and these are often hotly contested. Indeed, more water trades are opposed in Colorado than in New Mexico.
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Wyoming's legal system has been interpreted as being hostile to water trading. Arizona has had relatively fewer agriculture-to-urban transactions due to a relatively unfriendly court system and prohibitions against transferring water outside of a major water supply organization within the state. 20 Further, all water supply organizations within a drainage area in Arizona must approve proposed transfers before state approval can be given. This authority gives those organizations a potential veto on any proposed transfer without having to prove harm.
Potential third-party effects from water trades are a legitimate basis for regulatory review of proposed transactions, but the procedures for such review should be transparent and tightly defined. The aim is to reduce the transaction costs of exchange and at the same time limit rentseeking, whereby parties claim a "harm" in order to slow the transfer and extract a portion of the (often very large) rents that are associated with water re-allocation. Irrigation districts can be harmed financially if reduced water requirements leave them with stranded non-deployable fixed capital investments. There also can be increased administrative costs for the board as it evaluates and monitors the effects of water sales.
Because of a lack of clarity in district charters as to profit and cost sharing, the distribution of the revenues and costs of transfers is not straightforward and discretionary board decisions can be divisive and politically costly for officials. District members, who are not part of the transaction, will not want to shoulder costs involved. They also will be concerned about any spillover effects on their water supplies. These allocation problems are more challenging if the district is heterogeneous with respect to farm size, crop patterns, water use, and farmer support for transfers. 22 Board officials must also manage groundwater withdrawal if surface sales lead farmers to turn to groundwater for replacement. The board is responsible for the districtwide effects of subsurface water drawdown.
The Federal Bureau of Reclamation.
Much of the water supplied to agricultural water organizations, such as irrigation districts, comes from Bureau of Reclamation Projects. The Bureau is the largest wholesaler of water in the U.S. The water is transmitted either through long-term service contracts to those who hold water rights or in some cases, the Bureau holds the water rights and distributes the water within its reclamation projects. As a federal agency, there are mixed incentives for water transfers. It is subject to constituent political pressure in Congress from groups that may or may not support water trades. And as with state regulatory agencies, federal civilian employees do not benefit financially from any water re-allocation.
Indian Tribes.
The water held by Indian tribes potentially is a major source of water for marketing.
Indian tribes have reserved water rights sufficient for the development of agriculture on their reservations. Their water rights date from when the reservation was established by treaty with the federal government, which was usually in the 19 th century, and therefore generally supersede the priority of non-Indian claimants. Many of these treaty provisions have only been recently enforced and Indian water rights adjudicated through litigation or congressional statute. This water often must come from existing users. Tribes own their resources communally, and their decision-making processes vary. As a result, tribal water litigation may in the short run, at least, increase uncertainty regarding water rights and transfers. Water may not be exchanged if it is subject potentially to Indian treaty claims.
VII. The Physical Characteristics of Water and Weak Water Rights.
Water rights are weak because of legal constraints on ownership, state regulatory intervention, and the existence of multiple decision makers with mixed motives for market trades. The physical characteristics of water also play a very critical role in complicating the assignment of clear property rights and raising the costs of precisely defining them.
A. The High Costs of Bounding.
Due to its physical mobility, water cannot be bounded easily or partitioned across claimants and uses. Streams move across the ground and seep within it. They cross both multiple private land holdings and political jurisdictions. Water in lakes is less migratory, but particular parcels of water cannot be constrained at low cost within property lines. Groundwater also migrates, and it is unobserved. For all of these reasons, it is difficult to define and enforce property boundaries to freshwater.
Accordingly, exclusive control of moving water is difficult to achieve. As a result, numerous parties typically use the same body of water either simultaneously or sequentially. As demand grows relative to a relatively fixed water supply, disputes develop as use by one party conflicts with that of another. Opportunity costs rise, and absent clear property rights, the parties have little basis for exchange, as occurs for example with land, to address conflicting demands.
Access to a defined amount and quality of water becomes less certain, making production and consumption of water services less predictable. Resource values decline relative to what might be possible with more secure rights.
Over the long term, the gains from defining more precise property rights may offset bounding costs, and new rights arrangements may emerge. The mobility of water, high measurement costs, distributional disputes, and public good claims, however, will make this process of institutional change more complex than envisioned by Demsetz (1967) .
B. The High Costs of Measurement.
Fluidity and a lack of observability raise the costs of measuring the amount of water held in a water right. These effects are most critical for groundwater. The quantity in any particular location is not precisely known, and it is affected by a variety of forces that deplete or augment it in ways that cannot be easily determined or measured. Extraction by one user drains the water that is available elsewhere for another party. Many aquifers are replenished gradually both from natural sources and from the recharge of the very groundwater that is extracted but not fully consumed. These processes are slow and very complex, affected by intricate hydraulic factors, variable precipitation, evaporation, and the nature of groundwater-surface water exchange.
A property right to surface water can be measured more accurately because it is observable. Because water is mobile, the amount claimed is demarcated in terms of diversion.
The extent of each diversion, however, varies over time due to fluctuating precipitation. These seasonal precipitation patterns are predictable and are incorporated into a water claim. This is not the case, however, for annual precipitation variation that leads to uncertainty in water supply.
Drought patterns are highly erratic and difficult to forecast with existing models. As a result it is hard to define an exact amount of water that will be available for diversion at any point in time.
This supply uncertainty complicates the granting of definite water rights and the writing of contracts for water exchanges because neither buyers nor sellers know exactly how much water can be transacted at any specified period. .
Water diversions can be measured more easily than actual consumption, which is affected by the nature of use and by geologic and hydraulic conditions. Measuring consumption is important because it indicates the amount of diverted water that is released as recharge for subsequent claiming and use by others. Some surface water used for irrigation is consumed by plants; some evaporates; and some seeps into the soil to groundwater, streams, or ditches. This released water is available for successive uses in irrigation, urban and industrial consumption or in aquatic habitat. But because consumptive use is imprecisely known, the size of return flows is difficult to determine and accordingly, the quantity of water that can be granted subsequently to downstream water rights claimants is not certain.
C. The Interconnected Private and Public Goods Characteristics of Water.
Because of the high costs of bounding and measuring water claims, there is a high degree of interaction among claimants and the multiple applications of water, both public and private.
Indeed, the simultaneous and sequential provision of private and public goods is an important complicating factor in assigning of property rights to water because it is physically difficult to segment into its various uses. Consider the production of both rivalrous and non-rivalrous goods using water as introduced earlier.
Private goods production from water involves competing, rivalrous uses, but most do not consume all of the water devoted to them. As noted above, an upstream farmer who diverts water for irrigation will use only part of it, with the remainder percolating through the ground back to aquifers, streams, or to ditches for repeated access by other parties. This relationship, however, ties users together because variations in upstream consumption can have important implications for downstream claimants.
There are similar problems of interconnected claims for groundwater. Groundwater often is in hydrologic communication with surface flows, so that those who consume surface water affect the quantity and quality available to those who extract groundwater. In the same way, those who pump groundwater reduce surface supplies that otherwise are replenished by springs and other subterranean seepage. Pumping by one user also decreases the amount of groundwater available to others by lowering water tables and raising extraction costs. In transfers involving groundwater there is significant hydrologic uncertainty in determining how other parties will be affected.
By definition, public goods production using water involves non-competing or nonrivalrous uses of water. A free-flowing stream is available to all; consumption by one party has negligible impact on consumption by others. For this reason, most public goods are provided by the state either because of the inability to prevent access leads private parties to focus on activities with greater appropriability or because private efforts to limit access reduce production of public goods. But critically, the decision by the state to provide public goods from water is rivalrous because it constrains the provision of private goods. In most cases, historical use of water has been in private agriculture, mining, or hydroelectricity production. The decision to divert some of this water to maintenance of in-stream flows for aquatic habitat, recreation, or visual amenities then necessarily requires constraints on previous uses. But unless rights have been well-defined and recognized, trade and voluntary re-allocation of water may not occur.
Arbitrary re-assignment of water, as occurs under the "public trust" doctrine as described above result in wasteful conflict and delay, dissipating both private and public values.
Accordingly, the concurrent and/or sequential use of water due to the high costs of bounding and measurement result in numerous interdependent claims. Multiple parties can be affected inadvertently by any change in use to allocation. As noted earlier, because the potential for harm, transfers of surface water rights in western states require that there is "no harm or injury" to downstream rights holders. Compliance with this requirement is difficult to demonstrate if the transfer involves changes in the timing, location, or use of water. As a consequence, water transfers may be restricted to historical consumption, not water diverted. But the former is more difficult to document. Further, the no harm rule makes any trade vulnerable to a variety of constituent claims, some legitimate and some pure holdup. State agencies enforce these and other regulations, and most water trades that involve new uses must be approved by them. As demonstrated above, the process of application, processing, and evaluation can be lengthy and complicated. This raises the transaction costs of defining clear property rights to water and facilitating its exchange.
The protection of public, non-exclusive goods also raises the transaction costs of water trades. Regulatory interventions in the absence of clear private property rights result in arbitrary and often uncompensated re-allocation of water. These actions further weaken property rights, reducing incentives for investment in water and its trade. Reduced investment means foregone improvements in water quality or conservation, and lost trade means not only alternative, valuable uses foregone, but also the loss of useful information about alternative water uses that otherwise would be generated by water market trades.
Avoiding these losses of the common-pool requires the definition of clear property rights to water. Defining private property rights must involve the many parties who draw from the same mobile water source and whose uses are intertwined. Determination of the number of parties requires information on the size of the water area and drainage from one use to another.
It requires an allocation mechanism that is acceptable, measurable, and enforceable. The mechanism must be responsive to inherent variation in water supplies due to seasonality and the vagaries of precipitation.
VIII. Policy Responses.
Useful public policy responses to promote property rights definition are to provide: 1).
climatic, geologic, and hydraulic information for the definition of water rights; 2). registration and demarcation institutions to record water rights and to accurately measure historical consumption; 3). conflict resolution and enforcement institutions; and 4). overall support for the concept of private water rights and exchange. The latter should include the recognition and purchase of private water rights when it is necessary to provide public goods, rather than arbitrary seizure or taking of water without fair compensation. In the case of groundwater, government-mandated unitization (single ownership and management) of groundwater, as is done with oil and gas reservoirs, is a solution to excessive access and drawdown. In the case of unitization, a single "unit operator" extracts from and develops the reservoir. All other parties share in the net returns as share holders. This arrangement eliminates competitive withdrawal and directs extraction toward maximization of the economic value of the entire reservoir, rather than of the segments (leases) held by individual parties. Myers and Worm (2003) could report that the world's major predatory fish populations were in a state of serious depletion.
Historically, the initial regulatory response has been to deny access to certain groups based on political influence-non-citizens with expansion of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), sports versus commercial fishers, inshore versus offshore fishers, large-vessel versus small-vessel fishers, or vise-versa, and so on. This action temporarily reduced fishing pressure, but it did not solve the fundamental problem which is that rents exist for those who can find ways around the regulations.
As these failed, new regulations such as fixed seasons, area closures, and gear restrictions were put in place. These arrangements are politically attractive to regulators because they do not upset status quo rankings, minimize existing transaction costs, and call for major regulatory mandates, which are attractive to regulators and politicians. But they have not been successful.
They do not align the incentives of fishers with protection of the stock. Further, given heterogeneous fishers and limited and asymmetric information about the stock and the contribution of fishing relative to natural factors, there are disputes about the design and efficacy of these regulations. Finally, there is no basis for fishers to contract among themselves to reduce fishing pressure and thereby to capture the returns from an improved stock. There are no property rights to exchange.
There has been a turn to individual transferable quotas (ITQ's) in some fisheries, almost always after continued declines in the stock under centralized regulation. ITQ's require restrictions on entry, the setting of an annual total allowable catch, TAC, the allocation of rights or quotas to a share of the TAC, and enforcement. As such, ITQ's are a usufruct right-the right to fish-not a right to the stock and the aquatic habitat. This limited rights arrangement is similar to western US water rights.
The more secure, definite, durable, divisible, and permanent the ITQ, the stronger is the property right. And stronger property rights better link the incentives of fishers with the goal of maximizing the economic value of the fishery. Government regulators still determine the annual catch and then distribute that catch among ITQ holders. With permanent and transferable catch quotas, the quota holders find it to their advantage to preserve and if necessary rebuild the marine resources. The value of the share of the TAC depends on the state of fish stocks and the sustainability of the fishery. Enforcement costs may decline relative to those under other forms of regulation because fishers have a stake in the preservation of the stock as shareholders in the right to fish and self-monitor.
The general consensus is that ITQ's have been very successful in restraining fishing pressure and it rebuilding the economic value of the stock. They require the collaboration of fishers and regulators in gathering information to set the annual allowable catch. They also require that fisheries be bounded and protected, and given mobile fish stocks this can be at significant cost. The individual quotas must be defined clearly and exclusively and be enforced.
They also must be transferable. All of these requirements are similar to those encountered in water. The success of ITQ's and their gradual spread across countries and fisheries, despite the high costs involved, provides optimism for similar success in defining water rights more completely and in promoting their re-allocation.
IX. Concluding Remarks.
This essay outlines the complex nature of water rights and the high transaction costs of trading them. It uses the tools of the New Institutional Economics to explain why price disparities between water uses have been so profound and persistent. And it draws on transaction costs economics to derive useful state responses to promote markets and the re-allocation of water from agriculture to urban and environmental uses. Water trades take place and are growing in frequency and magnitude, but they are not sufficient to cause water prices to equalize on the margin, adjusting for transport costs. Transfers that involve changes in use and the timing and location of use are heavily regulated with options for multiple constituencies to challenge. These transfer regulations vary across the states, and in part, explain the observed differences in the extent of transfers. The basis for strict state regulation lies in the interconnected nature of water uses, some rivalrous and some not, and the public trust doctrine.
As described here, a key problem lies in the fact that individuals do not have clear, complete private property rights to water. The states hold water rights in trust for their citizens and private parties hold usufruct rights. Additionally, even these rights are often held by third parties, irrigation districts or similar organizations. Profit and cost sharing rules within districts are complex so that there may be no clear residual claimants to the returns from any transfer.
Moreover, expansion of the public trust doctrine threatens to weaken water rights by stressing their non-vested, revocability without compensation. For all of these reasons water markets will require significant institutional change toward greater precision in the definition of individual water rights, if voluntary market transactions are to be the primary way of reallocating water in the western U.S. Similar issues are likely to exist in other semi-arid regions where increased fresh water scarcity will provide pressure for water re-allocation.
An advantage of markets is their flexibility in responding to changes in water values. Of course, there is the problem of valuing non-traded, public goods uses of water. But there are increasingly sophisticated mechanisms for quantifying non-market values for guidance in allocation. Another advantage of markets is that they can make re-allocation routine, rather than relying on the political process, which by definition will be politicized and potentially contentious.
Meeting new and often conflicting demands for scarce water involve re-allocation from past uses to new ones. Water markets can be more effective than the political and regulatory process for many re-allocations. Even where provision of public goods requires limits on private water use, water rights can be purchased and retired. In that way, more voluntary and less contentious redistributions are possible. Markets, however, require the definition of property rights and the lowering of transaction costs. Useful public policy responses then are to provide for the clearer definition and enforcement of property rights to water and to lowering the transaction costs of trading those rights. Given the dramatic differences in observed values, water will be re-allocated one way or another. The question is whether this will take place smoothly and routinely in a manner that minimizes waste or whether it will be slow, contentious, and costly. The New Institutional Economics and property rights theory provide the conceptual bases for understanding the challenges at hand and for useful policy responses for addressing them. Given the critical importance of the water resource and the limited nature of current markets, this is a task worth undertaking.
